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Suppose You Want To Depose Opposing Counsel:
Shelton v. American Motors Corp.
Coletta Shelton died when her Jeep CJ-5, designed, manu-
factured, and sold by American Motors Corporation ("AMC"),
overturned.' Discovery disputes plagued Coletta's parents'
products liability action igainst AMC from the outset.2 The
plaintiffs filed notice to take the depositions of several individu-
als, including Rita Burns, an attorney in AMC's legal depart-
ment.3 At her deposition, Burns refused to answer several
questions dealing with the existence or nonexistence of docu-
ments relating to the safety record of the Jeep CJ 4 Burns
1. Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1324 (8th Cir. 1986).
2. Id The plaintiffs alleged various theories of recovery, including strict
liability, negligence, and failure to warn. ld at 1324-25. Shortly after initiating
the action, the plaintiffs filed notices to take depositions of 21 individuals pur-
suant to Rule 30(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id at 1325. AMC
moved to quash the depositions, and requested a protective order that would
require AMC to produce no more than six people who possessed the informa-
tion the plaintiffs sought. Id. The district court granted AMC's protective or-
der, but directed AMC to produce, if necessary, any additional knowledgeable
people. Id Following the depositions of these six individuals, the plaintiffs
moved for sanctions, including default judgment, alleging that AMC instructed
some individuals not to answer certain questions. d. The district court re-
ferred all discovery matters to the United States magistrate, who denied plain-
tiffs' motion for sanctions. Id at 1325.
3. Id Initially, the plaintiffs served notices to take depositions, specifi-
cally naming 21 deponents and designating 10 categories of specific areas the
depositions were to cover under Rule 30(b)(6). Id. Rule 30(b)(6) allows a
party both to name a corporation as the deponent and to disclose the, matters
on which examination is requested. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). The depo-
nent corporation must designate a person having knowledge of the matters in
each category to testify on behalf of the corporation. See id. When AMC ob-
jected to the individuals the plaintiffs named as deponents, the district court
ordered A.MC to designate a deponent in each of the 10 categories and later
directed AMC to allow the plaintiffs to depose two of their in-house counsel,
including Burns. Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1325. AMC had assigned Burns specifi-
cally to represent the company in this matter. Id. AMC moved to quash the
deposition, but the magistrate denied the motion. Id
4. Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 106 F.R.D. 490, 492 (W.D. Ark.
1985), rev'd, 805 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1986). Burns declined to disclose whether
she knew of the existence or nonexistence of documents in AMC's possession
concerning: (1) a list of all lawsuits nationwide against AMC involving Jeep
CJ turnovers; (2) test or demonstration results of the Jeep CJ regarding its
rollover propensity; (3) any computer modeling of the Jeep CJ; and (4) the sta-
tistical tabulations of utility vehicles in rollover accidents. Id
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claimed that either the work-product doctrine or the attorney-
client privilege protected the information the plaintiffs sought5
The plaintiffs then moved for sanctions against AMC, including
default judgment for Burns's refusal to answer the questions.6
At a hearing on the motion for sanctions, the district court
granted the plaintiffs' motion for default judgment, holding
that the work-product doctrine does not bar inquiry into an at-
torney's mere knowledge of the existence of a document On
appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court, holding in
Shelton v. American Motors Corp.8 that when the deponent is
the opposing counsel and has engaged in a selective process of
5. Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1325. Burns's typical response to these questions
was as follows:
Any information I have concerning documents which might possibly
be responsive to your question, I've acquired solely through my capac-
ity as an attorney for American Motors in my efforts to find informa-
tion which would assist me in defending the company in litigation,
and therefore, I decline to respond to the question.
Id. Burns also stated:
You see, whether or not I am aware of the documents, in part reflects
the efforts that I have made and decisions I have made concerning
what I think is important in the litigation. Who rve gone to to find
out what documents they have, what documents I have looked at [sic].
Id. at 1328 (quoting Burns's Second Deposition at 19). Burns and AMC's trial
counsel believed that her mere acknowledgment of the existence of the docu-
ments would reveal her legal theories and mental impressions, which the
work-product doctrine protected. I-
6. Id at 1325. The magistrate initially ordered that the plaintiffs' attor-
ney take Burns's deposition in his presence so he could rule on any objections
AMC made concerning the work-product doctrine. Id- When Burns appeared
before the magistrate, she again refused to respond to questions concerning
her knowledge of the existence or nonexistence of the documents. Id. The
magistrate overrruled most of AMC's objections, finding that the work-prod-
uct doctrine did not protect the information sought by the plaintiffs. Id at
1326. The magistrate recommended that the district court conduct a hearing
to determine why the court should not hold Burns in contempt and why it
should not enter default judgment against AMC as a sanction. Id At the
hearing, AMC refused to back down, deciding to "stand on its position" as
stated in the depositions. Id-
7. Shelton v. American Motors, 106 F.RPD. 490, 494 (W.D. Ark. 1985),
rev'd, 805 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1986). In addition, the district court held that the
attorney-client privilege did not protect the information sought by the plain-
tiffs. Id. (following Arkansas Nat'l Bank v. Cleburne County Bank, 258 Ark.
329, 331, 525 S.W.2d 82, 85 (1975)). The district court concluded that although
the documents or knowledge of the documents came to Burns while she acted
for her client; she could not invoke the attorney-client privilege. Id at 493.
The district court found that AMO's deliberate failure to comply with the
magistrate's discovery order constituted willful contempt, and represented suf-
ficient bad faith tb warrant the sanction of default judgment under Rule
37(b)(2)(c). See id. at 495-98.
8. 805 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1986).
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compiling documents from among voluminous files-in prepara-
tion for litigation, the mere acknowledgment of the existence of
those documents would reveal counsel's mental impressions,
which the work-product doctrine protects.9
The Shelton case raises two important issues. The first
concerns the propriety of taking the deposition of the opposing
attorney and the means courts should use to decide if a party
can depose opposing counsel. The second issue concerns
whether courts should expand the coverage of the work-prod-
uct doctrine to allow an attorney to refuse to acknowledge the
mere existence or nonexistence of documents, if a court orders
the attorney to submit to deposition by opposing counsel. Vir-
tually all trial attorneys engage in some form of discovery, and
depositions play a crucial role in the discovery process. Attor-
neys therefore must know whom they can .depose and what
may be asked, and indeed, whether they themselves are subject
to deposition.10
This Comment assesses the wisdom of the Shelton decision
by examining the relevant policy considerations and the practi-
cal consequences that are likely to follow from the decision.
Part I describes the prior law on deposing opposing counsel and
the protections of the work-product doctrine that set the stage
for the Shelton decision. Part II explains the holdings and rea-
soning of the Shelton decision. Part III closely examines both
the virtues and shortcomings of the court's analysis and offers
an alternative proposal that would place limited but appropri-
ate restrictions on the practice of deposing opposing counsel.
9. Id. at 1329. Because the court found that the work-product doctrine
barred inquiry into the existence or nonexistence of documents, the court did
not address whether the attorney-client privilege would offer the same protec-
tion to this type of information. I&. at 1329 & n.6.
10. The filing of amicus briefs by 34 parties underscored the importance
of this case. The amici curiae in the case included the Defense Research Insti-
tute, Inc., Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc.,
and the American College of Trial Lawyers, who urged reversal of the district
court's decision. Id- at 1333. In addition, 31 corporations joined and adopted
the American College of Trial Lawyers' brief. Id. Those corporations were
Aluminum Co. of America, American Cyanamid Co., Atlantic Richfield Co.,
Bethlehem Steel Corp., Celanese Corp., Chevron Corp., The Coca-Cola Co.,
Dart & Kraft, Inc., Deeve & Co., Delta Air Lines, Inc., The Greyhound Corp.,
Hershey Foods Corp., International Business Machines Corp., Kraft, Inc., Luk-
ens, Inc., Mobil Corp., Monsanto Co., National Steel Corp., Owens-Illinois, Inc.,
PPG Industries, Inc., RCA Corp., Reynolds Metals Co., Robertshaw Controls
Co., Sears Roebuck & Co., Texaco, Inc., Texas Instruments, Inc., Trans-
technology Corp., TRW, Inc., United States Steel Corp., Westinghouse Electric
Corp., and Westvaco Corp. Id at 1333 n.3.
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The proposal also would permit inquiries into the existence of
documents. The Comment concludes that Congress designed
the discovery rules to reveal nearly all the relevant matters re-
lated to a dispute, and that courts should put few, if any, limita-
tions on this process.
I. DEPOSING OPPOSING COUNSEL AND OPINION
WORK PRODUCT
A. OPPOSING COUNSEL IS NOT IMMUNE FROM DEPOSITION
Rule 30(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a party may take the deposition of "any person."'-' Be-
cause the Rules do not specifically prohibit taking the deposi-
tion of the opposing counsel, courts have permitted such
depositions.' 2 Although deposing the opposing counsel is not a
common practice,'3 it is becoming an increasingly popular vehi-
cle of discovery.' 4
Because an attorney is the deponent, however, and because
confrontations often arise when adversaries oppose each other
without a judge presiding, some courts have placed limitations
on the taking of such depositions.' 5 The most common limita-
tion is the requirement that the information sought be unavail-
11. Rule 30(a) provides in part: "After commencement of the action, any
party may take the testimony of any person... by deposition upon oral exami-
nation." FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a).
12. See, ag., Hunt Int'l Resources Corp. v. Binsten, 98 F.R.D. 689, 690
(N.D. M. 1983) (holding that opposing counsel may depose attorney who repre-
sents party in litigation); see also In re Arthur Treacher's Franchisee Litig., 92
F.R.D. 429, 437 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (stating that Rule 30(a) permits deposing attor-
ney representing party to action); Walker v. United Parcel Serv., 87 F.R.D.
360, 361 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (stating that attorney for party to suit receives no spe-
cial immunity from deposition); Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hosp., 68 F.R.D.
583, 588 (D.D.C. 1975) (recognizing that attorney for party may be examined
by deposition); see generally 1 R. SUGABMAN & S. NORTH, DEPOSITION STRAT-
EGY, LAw & FoRms § 2.01[1][c], at 2-16 to -17 (1988) (stating courts uniformly
have held that party's attorney is subject to examination); 8 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2102, at 369-70 (1970) (stating
that attorney may be deposed even though attorney represents party to suit).
13. In re Arthur Treacher's Franchisee Litig., 92 F.R.D. 429, 438 (E.D. Pa.
1981); Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hosp., 68 F.R.D. 583, 588 (D.D.C. 1975).
14. Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1327 (8th Cir. 1986).
One possible explanation for this increasing popularity is that in the past at-
torneys were reluctant to depose their opposing counsel as a matter of profes-
sional courtesy. Today, however, with the entire legal community becoming
more competitive and adversarial, attorneys are using every available method,
including deposing the opposing counsel, to further their client's interests.
15. See cases cited infra notes 16, 22, 27 and accompanying text.
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able from other discoverable sources.' 6 Justification for this
requirement lies in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Rules provide that a court may limit the use of discovery if an
attorney can obtain the information from more convenient and
inexpensive sources.' 7 The United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Hickman v. Taylor' also provides support for this
requirement.19 In Hickman, the Court stated that lawyers
must be able to perform their duties with a certain degree of
privacy and they therefore must be relatively free from intru-
sion and interference by opposing parties and their counsel.20
16. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 12, § 2026, at 229 (acknowl-
edging that deposable information is obtainable from party's attorney if no
other source is available). A person's status as an attorney creates no deposi-
tion immunity. Al If an interrogatory to the attorney would reveal the infor-
mation, however, a court would not force an attorney to give the information
by deposition. a; see aiso N.F.A. Corp. v. Riverview Narrow Fabrics, Inc., 117
F.R.D. 83, 86 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (requiring movant to demonstrate that taking
opposing counsel's deposition is only practical ziieans available of obtaining in-
formation); Maryland v. Baltimore & 0. R. R. Co., 7 F.R.D. 666, 667 (D. Pa.
1947) (holding that vhen party can obtain information elsewhere, he may not
seek it through deposition of opposing counsel).
17. Rule 26(b)(1) states that "the frequency or extent of use of the discov-
ery methods ... shall be limited by the court if it determines that... the dis-
covery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from
some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expen-
sive." FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(b)(1).
18. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
19. The Hickman case concerned a discovery dispute associated with the
sinking of a tugboat in which five of the nine crew members drowned. Ad at
498. Anticipating that representatives of the deceased crew members might
bring suits, the tugboat owners hired an attorney who privately interviewed
the survivors and other persons believed to have information relating to the
accident. Id The attorney secured several signed statements from these wit-
nesses and also made private memoranda on what they told him. r& Ulti-
mately, representatives of the deceased crew did file suits. I& The plaintiffs
filed several interrogatories, including one that asked if the tugboat owners'
attorney had taken any statements from witnesses. Id If such statements ex-
isted, whether oral or written, defendants were requested to forward the state-
ments to the plaintiffs. a at 499. Although admitting that he had taken the
survivors' statements, the defendants' attorney declined to summarize or set
forth the contents on the ground that such requests constituted an attempt to
obtain counsel's private files. Id The United States Supreme Court agreed
with the tugboat owners' attorney and held that because this information was
readily available to the plaintiffs directly from the witnesses, the request for
written statements, private memoranda, and personal recollections the attor-
ney prepared fell outside the arena of discovery. Id at 510. The Court con-
cluded that even the most liberal of discovery theories could not justify
unwarranted inquiries into the files and mental impressions of an attorney.
Ld-
20. The Supreme Court stated.
Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to work
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Adopting the Court's view, Congress put limitations in the Fed-
eral Rules on a lawyer's ability to depose opposing counsel
when the information is readily available elsewhere.2 '
Federal courts have developed varying and conflicting in-
terpretations of both Hickman and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Some courts have interpreted the Federal Rules and
Hickman to require that an attorney who wishes to depose the
opposing attorney show "good cause" why the deposition is nec-
essary.22 These courts assert that taking an attorney's deposi-
tion is so intrusive that the party requesting the deposition
must persuade the court that it is appropriate before the court
will grant permission. 23 Other courts have imposed no limita-
tions, allowing parties to depose the opposing counsel just as a
lawyer deposes any other person.24 These courts, apparently
unconcerned with the actual identity of the deponent, place
greater importance on allowing broad and liberal discovery.25
Still other courts, although not imposing any mandatory re-
quirements, have identified certain factors, which judges should
for the advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the rightful
interests of his clients. In performing his various duties, however, it is
essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free
from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.
Proper preparation of a client's case demands that he assemble infor-
mation, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant
facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue
and needless interference.
Id- at 510-11.
21. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Draney v. Wilson, Morton, Assaf & McElligot, 30 Fed. R.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 960, 961 (D. Ariz. 1980) (holding that courts should per-
mit deposition of attorney of record sparingly and only upon showing of good
cause); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 3d 786, 790, 140
Cal. Rptr. 677, 679 (1977) (declaring that courts should severely restrict prac-
tice of taking deposition of opposing counsel and should allow it only upon
showing of extremely good cause).
23. See ag., Trade Center Properties, Inc. v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App.
2d 409, 411, 8 Cal. Rptr. 345, 347 (1960). In stating that a party should take the
deposition of the opposing counsel only upon a showing of extremely good
cause, the Trade Center court referred to the sound policy reasons expounded
in Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Hickman v. Taylor. Id.
24. See, eg., In re Arthur Treacher's Franchisee Litig., 92 F.R.D. 429, 438
(E.D. Pa. 1981). The Arthur Treacher's court stated that if an attorney of rec-
ord possesses relevant, non-privileged information, the other party may dis-
cover it just as if a party or nonparty to the litigation possessed the
information. Id-
25. By focusing on the information sought rather than on the person who
possesses the information, the Arthur Treacher's court relied on the words rel-
evant and non-privileged. Id.; see also FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(b)(1) (providing for
discovery of "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant").
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consider when ruling on the appropriateness of a deposition,
that are unique to situations where the deponent is the oppos-
ing counsel.2 6 Finally, some courts have exercised their author-
ity under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to maintain
appropriate control over the discovery process to resolve the
problem of deposing counsel and have ordered that the lawyer
depose opposing counsel only with written questions.27 By
26. In Arthur Treacher's, the court recognized that an attorney's testi-
mony at a deposition may create a situation in which the attorney would have
to remove himself as counsel for the client. 92 F.R.D. at 439. In Draney, the
court stated that the adversarial nature of litigation causes the tempers of
counsel to flare. 30 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 961. Thus, permitting an
attorney on one side to become the inquisitor of an attorney on the other side
carries the risk of providing another source of fuel. dE
Indeed, the rules of professional responsibility provide for the disqualifica-
tion of attorneys when they face the conflicting roles of advocate and witness.
The Model Code provides that the lawyer must withdraw if it is'apparent that
the testimony will be prejudicial to the client. See MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-102(B) (1980). Similarly, the Model Rules pro-
vide that a lawyer should not serve as advocate if the lawyer's truthful
testimony will adversely affect the client's interests. See MODE RULES OF
PROFESsIONAL CoNDucT Rule 3.7(a) (1983).
Even if the rules of professional responsibility do not disqualify the attor-
ney, see id. Rule 3.7(a)(I)-(3) (exceptions to disqualification mandate), attor-
neys who attempt to serve as advocates for a client although testifying during
a deposition in the same case still face a very difficult situation. As advocates,
attorneys naturally will feel sympathy for their clients, and will desire to pre-
vail in the litigation in order to enhance professional esteem and reputation
and possibly to collect a percentage of a favorable judgment. These strong in-
centives may cause lawyers to slant testimony or to recite facts while com-
menting on the evidence. Yet as witnesses, attorneys must abide by the rules
obligating them to remain neutral and objective. Thus, the conflict between
these two roles quite possibly will put attorneys in a no-win situation. See gen-
erally C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICs 375-90 (1986) (discussing problems
that arise when attorney takes on conflicting roles of advocate and witness).
27. See, e.g., In re Arthur Treacher's Franchisee Litig., 92 F.R.D. 429, 439
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (using Rule 26(c) and directing that one party depose other
party's attorney through written questions); American Standard Inc. v. Ben-
dix, 80 F.R.D. 706, 708 (WM. Mo. 1978) (noting that court ordered one party to
depose other party's attorney through interrogatory). Rule 26(c) provides in
part:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is
sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is
pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court
in the district where the deposition is to be taken may make any or-
der which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoy-
ance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,
including one or more of the following- (1) that the discovery not be
had; (2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and
conditions, including a designation of the time or place; (3) that the
discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that
selected by the party seeking discovery ....
FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c).
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adopting this approach, these courts aim to avoid direct oral
confrontations of advocates in a potentially antagonistic and un-
productive setting.P
Thus, although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow
a lawyer to depose any person and contain no provisions specifi-
cally restricting the taking of the opposing counsel's deposition,
courts have recognized various potential problems with this
practice and have imposed restrictions.
B. EXISTENCE OF DOCUMENTS AND OPINION WORK PRODUCT
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a broad scope
of permissible discovery.2 9 When the deponent is an attorney
for a party in the litigation, however, courts have recognized
several limitations and privileges that narrow the scope of dis-
covery.30 For example, a court must protect conversations be-
tween attorney and client to preserve the integrity of that
relationship. The work-product doctrine, which protects cer-
tain documents an attorney prepares for litigation,3 ' is perhaps
28. Because each attorney represents opposite interests and positions,
such confrontations, when not supervised by a judge or magistrate, are poten-
tially antagonistic and quite possibly will accomplish little.
29. See, ag., Hoffman v. Delta Dental Plan, 517 F. Supp. 574, 575 (D.
Minn. 1981) (recognizing broad scope of discovery); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 12, § 2007, at 37 (stating that Federal Rules allow for broad scope of
dicovery).
A broad scope of discovery is desirable because it allows the parties to be
fully informed as to all the issues and facts surrounding the action, and the
parties thus can clarify fully the opposing legal and factual positions for the
enlightenment of the decisionmaker. See Note, Developments in the Law-
Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REV. 940, 1028 (1961).
Rule 26(b)(1) provides that "[plarties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter," and that par-
ties may seek discovery of information if it appears "reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
In addition, the Supreme Court has declared that "deposition-discovery
rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment" to ensure that both
parties have knowledge of all the relevant information. Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). The Hickman Court also noted that "[t]he way is now
clear.., for the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues
and facts before trial." Id at 501.
30. See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 12, §§ 2016-2027, at
122-238 (discussing limitations on scope of discovery). These commentators
recognize and discuss several limitations on discovery, including the attorney-
client privilege, the privilege against self-incrimination, governmental privi-
leges, the work-product rule, and certain confidential communications, such as
those with spouses, clergy, and physicians. Id
31. See id. §§ 2021-2027, at 178-238; see also Comment, Discovery of Attor-
ney's Work Product, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 284, 284-93 (1977) (explaining concept of
work product and reasons for its existence); Note, Discovery and the Work
1989] 1123
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the most significant of these limitations.
The work-product doctrine consists of two distinct catego-
ries,32 "ordinary work product" and "opinion work product."33
Ordinary work product generally embraces tangible items such
as legal memoranda, witness statements, correspondence, or
relevant background information that counsel selects and or-
ganizes; opinion work product generally includes intangible
items such as an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories.34 The concept of opinion work prod-
Product Doctrine, 11 LOY. U. CHi. L.J. 863, 864-72 (1980) (examining work
product doctrine as privilege or immunity).
32. See Note, supra note 29, at 1028 (noting two purposes of discovery, to
obtain facts and to obtain legal contentions); Note, supra note 31, at 871 (recog-
nizing "ordinary work product" and "opinion work product").
33. Ordinary work product encompasses documents and other tangible
things an attorney prepares in anticipation of litigation. Note, supra note 31,
at 871; see also Comment, supra note 31, at 286 (referring to ordinary work
product as "peripheral" work product). For a concise discussion of the work-
product doctrine, see Note, supra note 31, at 863-904 (comparing and contrast-
ing federal and fllinois work-product doctrines); see also Comment, supra note
31, at 284, 285-91 (noting different content and treatment of two categories of
work product material); Comment, The Potential for Discovery of Opinion
Work Product UnderRule 26(b)(3), 64 IowA L. REv. 103, 103-04 (1978) [herein-
after Comment, Potential for Discovery] (discussing two categories of work
product material).
Although a court may find a particular document or other thing protected
as opinion work product, such a finding does not necessarily mean that a party
cannot make the document the object of discovery. The precise degree of pro-
tection afforded an attorney's opinion work product, however, remains uncer-
tain in the federal courts. Some courts find opinion work product absolutely
immune from discovery, while other courts indicate that in some circum-
stances the work product doctrine must yield to disclosure. See In re Murphy,
560 F.2d 326, 335-36 (8th Cir. 1977) (noting disagreement among courts on ex-
tent to which opinion work product is privileged from discovery); Comment,
Potential for Discovery, supra (noting split among courts and commentators
on scope of opinion work product). This particular issue, however, is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
34. Note, Discovery of Attorney Work Product Reviewed by an Expert
Witness, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 812, 813 (1985); see also Comment, supra note 31,
at 285-91 (explaining items which are contained in two categories of work
product); Note, supra note 31, at 871-72 (delineating difference between opin-
ion work product and ordinary work product); see generally Note, Protection
of Qpinion Work Product Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 64 VA.
L. REV. 333, 333-47 (1978) (discussing opinion work product and policies behind
it).
Despite the Rule 26(b)(3)'s attempt to define opinion work product as
mental impressions, conclusions, and opinions, explanation is difficult because
the concept is intangible. The Third Circuit's" decision in Sporck v. Peil, 759
F.2d 312 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985), established the maximum
protection and furthest expansion of the work product doctrine. In Sporck,
the court held that when an attorney selects and compiles a folder of specific
1124 [Vol. 73:1116
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uct originated with the Supreme Court's decision in -icAcman a1
and Congress later codified it in the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, which provide that courts must protect the "mental im-
pressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an
attorney."36 Courts therefore draw a distinction between an at-
torney's written work and mental recollections, with the vari-
ous components of the work-product doctrine protecting each.
Despite the prevalence of the work-product doctrine,
courts uniformly have held that neither the work-product
doctrine nor any other privilege prevents an attorney from
questioning opposing counsel as to the mere existence or non-
existence of documents.31 The courts explain that although the
documents after searching through numerous files and records, this selective
folder receives opinion work-product protection and an attorney need not re-
veal it to the opposing party. Id. at 316-17. In Sporck, the attorney searched
through hundreds of thousands of documents to find those documents that
would prepare his client for an upcoming deposition, and then prepared a
folder containing these documents. Id. at 313. In finding the folder to be opin-
ion work product, the court concluded that although the documents them-
selves were not work product, the selection process represented the counsel's
mental impressions and legal opinions. Id. at 316; see also James Julian, Inc. v.
Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 144 (D. Del. 1982) (holding that when counsel
prepared binder of documents representing small percentage of thousands of
documents attorney had uncovered through discovery, binder itself repre-
sented counsel's opinions, which opinion work-product doctrine protects).
35. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947) (noting that state-
ments, memoranda, correspondence, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and
countless other tangible and intangible vehicles reflect lawyer's work in prepa-
ration of case and thus should be protected from discovery).
36. Rule 26(b)(3) provides in part, "the court shall protect against disclo-
sure of mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attor-
ney ...." FED. R. Cxv. P. 26(b)(3).
The Hickman Court articulated three policy considerations underlying its
decision to protect the work product of an attorney. It stated that failure to
hold an attorney's thoughts inviolate would deter counsel from making writ-
ten records and ultimately would work to the client's detriment. 329 U.S. at
511. In addition, the Court feared that free access to an attorney's work prod-
uct would promote inefficiency, unfairness, and sharp practices by an attorney
in giving advice and performing his other duties. Id. In a concurring opinion,
Justice Jackson added that "[d]iscovery was hardly intended to enable a
learned profession to perform its functions either without wits or on wits bor-
rowed from the adversary." Id at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring). Finally, the
Hickman Court stated that free access to work product would have a demoral-
izing effect upon the legal profession because of a perceived unfairness and
need to be somewhat crafty in preparing for trial. Id at 511.
Rule 26(b)(3), however, does not protect all of an attorney's opinions and
legal theories. Rule 33(b), for example, permits the discovery of interrogatory
information relating to the application of law to fact, and a court therefore
may obligate an attorney to disclose some opinions and legal theories. See R.
HAynocic & D. HEM1, DIscovERY PRACTICE § 1.6.3, at 35-36 (1982).
37. See, eg., Smith v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 30 F.R.D. 534, 538-39 (M.D.
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work-product doctrine may protect the contents of certain doc-
uments, the doctrine does not prevent inquiry as to the mere
existence of those documents.38 Courts apparently believe that
appropriate discovery, whereby parties are fully informed as to
all the facts and issues surrounding the action and are allowed
to discover where and how to obtain evidence that they may
use at trial, requires the disclosure of this type of information.
Thus, although a party has succeeded in persuading a court
to allow the deposition of th opposing couisel,39 an iridepend-
ent privilege or doctrine still may protect the information
sought. If the information sought pertains to the existence or
nonexistence of documents, however, the long-standing rule
has been to allow such inquiries.
II. THE DECISION IN SHELTON V.
AMERICAN MOTORS CORP.
A. INCREASED LIMITATIONS ON DEPOSING OPPOSING COUNSEL
The Shelton court first determined whether and under
what circumstances a court should order opposing counsel to
submit to a deposition.'4 The Eighth Circuit panel began by ex-
Tenn. 1962) (explaining that work-product doctrine does not prevent inquiry
into existence, if any, of reports or memoranda); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Ce-
lanese Corp. of Am., 14 F.R.D. 246, 249 (D. Del. 1953) (holding that party may
seek to elicit information as to existence, if any, of reports or other memo-
randa and of their location).
38. See, e.g., LaRocca v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 47 F.R.D. 278, 282
(W.D. Pa. 1969) (stating that inquiring party may learn if such papers or docu-
ments exist, and in whose custody they are, even though such papers or docu-
ments may not themselves be subject to discovery); Harvey v. Eimco Corp., 28
F.R.D. 380, 381 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (explaining that although party may not use
discovery to secure contents of work-product documents, party may obtain in-
formation about existence or whereabouts of these documents); McCall v.
Overseas Tankship Corp., 16 F.R.D. 467, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (holding that
work-product doctrine does not apply to information sought as to whether
there was such "work product," but only to information that documents con-
tained).
Opinions dealing with this issue are usually very short, offer extremely
limited discussions, and summarily dispose of the topic. The courts quickly de-
cided these cases on the grounds that these inquiries were a legitimate and ap-
propriate method of discovery that ought to be available to parties, and that
disclosure of the existence and location of relevant documents was not harm-
ful to the party making such disclosure.
39. Rule 30 intends depositions to occur without any court involvement.
See FED. R. Clv. P. 30(b). When a party challenges the appropriateness of a
particular deposition, however, court involvement becomes necessary to re-
solve the dispute. See id. 30(d).
40. Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1327 (8th Cir. 1986).
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pressing its view that the increasing practice of taking opposing
counsel's deposition is a "negative development" and one that
lawyers should employ only in limited circumstances. 41 The
court offered several policy justifications to support its position
that courts should restrict the right to depose opposing counsel.
Deposing the opposing counsel, according to the court, would
reward and promote attorney laziness, disrupt the adversarial
system, and lower the standards of the legal profession.42 In
addition, the court asserted that taking the deposition of the op-
posing attorney would add to the already burdensome time and
cost requirements of litigation by supplying another source of
pretrial delay, namely resolving work-product and attorney-cli-
ent privilege disputes.4 3 The court further stated that such dep-
ositions would detract from the quality of client representation
both by drawing attorneys away from their duties and by pro-
ducing a chilling effect on the truthful communications be-
tween attorneys and their cients. 4
Despite its opposition to the practice, the Shelton court did
not completely prohibit deposing the opposing counsel, but con-
ceded that circumstances may arise in which a court should or-
der the taking of opposing counsel's deposition.4 5 Drawing on
limitations found in the Federal Rules,45 as well as previous
court-imposed restrictions,47 the Eighth Circuit devised a new
test, allowing but severely limiting an attorney's opportunity to
depose opposing counsel. The test requires that before a party
may take the deposition of the opposing attorney, the party
41. Id- The Shelton court reaffirmed its opposition to the practice of de-
posing the opposing attorney in the final sentence of its opinion, which stated:
The harassing practice of deposing opposing counsel (unless that
counsel's testimony is crucial and unique) appears to be an adversary
trial tactic that does nothing for the administration of justice but
rather prolongs and increases the costs of litigation, demeans the pro-






46. Rule 26(b)(1) sets out the requirement that information sought in a
deposition be relevant and nonprivileged. See FED. R. Cxv. P. 26(b)(1). This
requirement appears as the second prong in the Shelton test. Shelton, 805 F.2d
at 1327.
47. Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327 (citing Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Superior
Court, 72 Cal. App. 3d 786, 790, 140 Cal. Rptr. 677, 679, (1977) (supporting
prong of test requiring information to be unavailable from other sources)).
The cases cited in note 16, supra, discuss the requirement that the information
sought be unavailable from other sources.
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must show that: (1) no means exist to obtain the information
other than to depose opposing counsel; (2) the information
sought is relevant and nonprivileged; and (3) the information is
crucial to the preparation of the case.48 The Shelton court
found that counsel could have obtained the information sought
by means other than deposing AMC's counsel. Thus, the plain-
tiffs failed to satisfy the first prong of the court's test. 49
B. EXPANDING THE COVERAGE OF OPINION WORK PRODUCT
After introducing its new test limiting the general practice
of deposing opposing counsel, the Shelton court narrowed its fo-
cus to determine which information it would protect from dis-
covery if a party succeeds in satisfying the test. The court
began by citing Hickman, referring to its disapproval of inter-
ference with an attorney's trial preparation. 50 The court then
turned to the issue of whether the work-product doctrine pro-
tects the attorney's mere acknowledgment that a document ex-
ists.-5 The court held that when "the deponent is opposing
counsel and opposing counsel has engaged in a process of select-
ing and compiling documents in preparation for litigation, the
mere acknowledgment of the existence of those documents
would reveal counsel's mental impressions, which are protected
48. Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327.
49. It seems the court could, and perhaps should, have ended discussion of
the issue at this point. In effect, the court found that the plaintiffs had not
satisfied the first requirement of its new attorney deposition test. Plaintiffs
therefore should not have deposed AMC's in-house counsel. Furthermore, be-
cause the plaintiffs based the motion for default judgment, which the district
court granted, on conduct that occurred during this deposition, the court could
have reversed the district court on grounds that the deposition never should
have occurred. Based on this analysis, the remainder of the Shelton court's
opinion concerning the opinion work-product doctrine should be regarded as
dicta.
50. The Shelton court cited the Supreme Court's acknowledgment in
Hickman that a party should not invade the privacy of an attorney's course of
preparation. I& at 1328. The court also cited the Supreme Court's eventual
holding that the work-product doctrine protects an attorney's mental impres-
sions, thought processes, opinions, conclusions, and legal theories. Ida; see
supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
51. AMC had argued that requiring attorneys to acknowledge the exist-
ence or nonexistence of certain documents would reflect the attorney's judg-
ment in identifying and selecting from the voluminous files those documents
which they felt were significant and important to the legal theories involVed.
Id at 1325 n.2, 1328 (noting that AMC searched 35,000 documents). AMC also
asserted that in situations where attorneys sift through numerous files, they
recollect only the specific documents they feel are important, and therefore re-
quiring them to testify whether specific documents exist would necessarily re-




In so holding, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that in situations
where reams of documents exist, the selection and compilation
of documents often is more important than actual legal re-
search.53 The court stated that in these circumstances, merely
requiring attorneys to acknowledge whether specific documents
exist would indicate that, because a document was important
enough to remember, the attorneys may have relied upon it in
preparing their client's case.-
In reaching its decision, the Shelton court disregarded the
line of cases holding that the work-product doctrine does not
apply when the information sought is the mere existence or
nonexistence of documents.55
IIL THE OVERZEALOUS COURT
A. COURTS SHOULD LIMIT ATTORNEY DEPOSITIONS, BUT NOT
PROHIBIT THEM
The Shelton court recognized that situations exist in which
taking opposing counsel's deposition may be appropriate.56 In
52. Id- at 1329. Because the Shelton court found that the opinion work-
product doctrine protected AMC's counsel from answering these questions, the
court did not decide the issue of whether the attorney-client privilege also
would protect this type of information. Id at 1329 & n.6. In addition, because
the court found that the opinion work-product doctrine protected the informa-
tion plaintiffs sought, it concluded that the imposition of default judgment was
erroneous. Id. at 1329.
53. Id. (citing James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 144 (D.
Del. 1982)).
54. Id. The Shelton court explained that where reams of documents exist,
the attorney's selective process of choosing specific documents reflects legal
theories and thought processes. I The court reasoned that where numerous
documents are present, attorneys will remember only those documents they
have selected as important to the legal theories involved. I As a result, com-
pelling attorneys to acknowledge whether a specific document exists necessar-
ily would reveal their mental selective process. I&
55. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. The Shelton court made
no attempt to distinguish its holding from this earlier precedent. Although
the court acknowledged that the cases existed, it stated '"The case at bar in-
volves answers to questions that would reveal more than the mere existence of
documents." Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1329. District Judge Battey, sitting by
designation, disagreed with the majority and filed a dissenting opinion, which
argued that the work-product doctrine does not protect answers as to the mere
existence or nonexistence of documents, even though the documents them-
selves were undiscoverable. Id. at 1332 (Battey, J., dissenting).
56. Before announcing its new attorney deposition test, the court noted
that some circumstances exist in which taking the opposing counsel's deposi-
tion may be appropriate. Id at 1327. Although the court gave no examples of
these circumstances, such situations certainly do exist. One such situation
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an effort to limit discovery in these situations, however, the
court imposed such burdensome restrictions that it rendered
would occur where the attorney is a fact witness. For example, if the attorney
for a party is present at a settlement conference between the plaintiff and de-
fendant and the conference evolves into a fist-fight, the attorney would be a
fact witness, and for purposes of a battery action by one of the parties,'taking
the attorney's deposition would be appropriate.
Another appropriate situation would arise when certain attorneys have
the best and most accurate information concerning matters relevant to a law-
suit. For example, an attorney for a party would have the best knowledge of
the nature and dates of services rendered and the associated fees and expenses
incurred. This information may be important to a case where a court has
awarded the plaintiff attorney's fees in addition to the judgment and the de-
fendant accepts the decision on the merits but challenges the reasonableness
of the amount of attorney's fees awarded. Another situation in which this in-
formation may be important is in a legal malpractice action. See, eg., Condon
v. Petacque, 90 F.R.D. 53, 54-55 (N.D. I1. 1981) (allowing deposition of attorney
in legal malpractice action).
A third situation might arise when the attorney's advice becomes an issue
in the case, such as when the defendant uses the advice as a defense. For ex-
ample, in N.F.A. Corp. v. Riverview Narrow Fabrics, 117 F.R.D. 83, 84-85
(M.D.N.C. 1987), the plaintiff instituted a patent infringement action and the
defendant, in its defense, relied on the advice and opinion letters from its at-
torney to show no willful infringement.
It is also appropriate to depose a party's attorney when the plaintiff's law-
yer accuses the defendant's attorney of bad faith negotiations and seeks puni-
tive damages. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App.
3d 786, 790, 140 Cal. Rptr. 677, 679-80 (1977) (holding that where attorney is
sale negotiator and punitive damages are sought on declaration of bad faith,
deposition of attorney is proper).
A final situation where deposing the opposing attorney would be appropri-
ate is when a party has made a good-faith, extensive effort to obtain the infor-
mation from other sources, but for reasons beyond the party's control has not
met with success. For example, in the Shelton case itself, the plaintiffs' coun-
sel purportedly made the following efforts to discover the "rollover tendency"
reports:
(1) propounded a substantial number of interrogatories, document re-
quests, and requests for admissions;
(2) answered 312 interrogatories, including subparts, propounded by
the Defendants to the Plaintiffs;
(3) [took] the depositions of 18 American Motors' personnel consist-
ing of 1,342 pages;
(4) attended and/or [took] the depositions of 4 fact witnesses, consist-
ing of 199 pages;
(5) traveled more than 10,648 air miles taking depositions and attend-
ing hearings;
(6) accumulated a pleadings file... measuring more than ten inches
thick;
(7) attended more than 20 hours of hearings ... concerning discovery
disputes
Appellees' Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 8, Shelton v. American Motors
Corp., 805 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1986) (No. 85-2442 WA). Despite these efforts,
the plaintiffs' attorney did not know whether American Motors' "rollover ten-
dency" documents existed. Id-
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some proper and necessary discovery impossible 5 7 The actual
attorney deposition test introduced,58 although containing some
valid and appropriate restrictions on taking the deposition of
the opposing attorney,59 extends beyond what is necessary to
accomplish the court's goal of preventing unwarranted intru-
sions into an attorney's preparation for trial. As a result, the
test unnecessarily restricts a valuable discovery tool.
The first prong of the Shelton test, requiring that counsel
have no means to obtain the information other than to depose
opposing counsel, resembles previous judicial attempts to re-
strict depositions of opposing counsel.6 0 The Supreme Court's
attempt in Hickman to keep an attorney free from unnecessary
interference is the basis for this requirement.61 As the Hick-
man Court recognized, sound policy justifications exist for pro-
tecting the work of an attorney in preparation for trial from
disclosure. For example, avoiding disruption of the adversarial
system, reducing the costs of pretrial litigation, upholding the
quality of client representation, and ensuring that attorneys do
not "borrow wits" from their adversaries are valid and proper
concerns of the court. Because these concerns probably would
materialize if a court permitted a party to depose the opposing
attorney at will, they form a legitimate basis on which to limit
the practice of deposing the opposing counsel. The requirement
that the information be unavailable from other discoverable
sources limits the instances in which a court could allow an at-
torney to depose the opposing counsel, thereby promoting the
policy considerations previously mentioned. In many situations,
attorneys most likely will not have knowledge of facts un-
known to their clients. Thus, in the vast majority of cases, an
attorney can discover necessary information directly through
deposition of the adverse party with no need to depose the op-
posing counsel.62 This first requirement therefore is necessary
57. See infra notes 66-75, 79-83 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 16, 22-23 and accompanying text. In addition, Rule
26(b)(1) provides authority for this requirement. See supra note 17 and accom-
panying text.
61. See supra notes 18-20, 35-36 and accompanying text.
62. In addition, attorneys likely will have learned whatever factual infor-
mation they possess from other sources whom the opposing party may depose.
The district court in Shelton made express findings that the plaintiffs had
satisfied the requirement of exhausting other avenues. Shelton v. American
Motors Corp., 106 F.R.D. 490, 497 (W.D. Ark. 1985), rev'd, 805 F.2d 1323 (8th
Cir. 1986). The court concluded that the plaintiffs had made attempts to se-
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to protect attorneys from needless interference, but does not
overly restrict discovery. Thus, courts should include it in an
attorney deposition test.
The second prong of the court's test requires that the infor-
mation sought be relevant and not privileged.63 The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which state that "[p]arties may obtain
discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is rele-
vant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,"64
mandate this requirement in any attorney deposition test. By
allowing only the discovery of relevant inf6rmation, this re-
quirement ensures that a party will not use discovery to delay
litigation.65 The relevancy requirement also ensures a proper
system of discovery by allowing discovery of any information
germane to the action, yet limiting discovery to prevent abuses.
Finally, the requirement also recognizes that a court will honor
established privileges. Because of these benefits, this require-
ment is advantageous and courts should use it to determine
when deposing an attorney is proper.
The third prong of the Shelton test'requires that before the
opposing counsel may be deposed, the party must show that
"the information sought is crucial to the preparation of the
case."66 Here, the court has created an additional hurdle that
unnecessarily burdens deposition-taking, the cornerstone of the
discovery process. By requiring that the information sought by
deposition be "crucial," the Eight Circuit ignored the virtues of
broad discovery6 7 and created a requirement of such ambiguity
and subjectivity that it only adds to the confusion. Close scru-
tiny of this requirement shows that it is not only contrary to
existing law, but also will lead to increased and unnecessary
litigation.
cure the information and that these efforts were relatively unsuccessful. I-
Moreover, the court stated that AMC had "played games" with the federal dis-
covery process during this suit by noting that the same AMC engineers who
prepared reports entitled "Relative Rollover Tendency" of the Jeep CJ later
contended that they could not respond to plaintiffs' discovery requests because
they did not understand the phrase "propensity to roll over." I.
63. Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327.
64. FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(b)(1).
65. Indeed, if the requirement of relevancy were not present, a party
could perform discovery on matters wholly unrelated to the dispute in order to
delay litigation. See generally FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's notes to
the 1983 Amendments (expressing desire to reduce opportunities to delay liti-
gation with discovery).
66. Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327.
67. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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More specifically, the requirement that the information
sought be "crucial" to the preparation of the case is contrary to
the Federal Rules6 8 and case law6 9 dealing with the permissible
scope of discovery. In describing which information is subject
to discovery, the Federal Rules provide that information is dis-
coverable if it "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence '." 70 Thus, the court's test does not
impose merely a more stringent standard, it creates a standard
so rigorous that it violates the broad discovery philosophy of
the Federal Rules. In addition, the requirement ignores estab-
lished case law. Courts uniformly have held that they will per-
mit discovery wherever there is "any possibility" that the
information sought may be relevant,7 1 emphasizing the desire
for a broad scope of discovery. Courts never have required that
information be "crucial" to be discoverable, as the Shelton court
required. Qite the contrary, courts have imposed only a very
minimal relevancy requirement.
Moreover, the "crucial" requirement will cause practical
litigation problems. The Shelton court stated that limiting the
practice of deposing the opposing attorney would reduce litiga-
tion time and costs.72 Courts will have the added burden, how-
68. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
69. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
70. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
71. See, e-g., American Int'l, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 100 F.R.D. 255,
257 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("any possibility"); Miller v. Doctor's Gen. Hosp., 76 F.R.D.
136, 138-39 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (same); In re Wheat Farmers Antitrust Class Ac-
ti6n, 440 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (D.D.C. 1977) (same). One court has stated that
"discovery is to be considered relevant where there is any possibility that the
information sought be relevant to the subject matter of the action." In re
Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 76 F.R.D. 420, 431 (N.D. IlM. 1977) (quotihg
United States v. International Business Mach. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 215, 218
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (emphasis in original)).
In this sense, the court's third requirement that information be crucial
seems to conflict with or at least severely to limit the court's second require-
ment that the information sought be relevant. Rule 26(b)(1)s requirement of
relevancy indicates that the question of relevancy is more loosely construed at
the discovery stage than at trial. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Because in
many cases the parties will not have defined clearly the issues at the time they
seek discovery, see, e.g., Patterson Oil Terminals, Inc. v. Charles Kurz & Co., 7
F.R.D. 250, 251 (E.D. Pa. 1945) (stating that pleadings may not clearly define
the issues), courts have required only relevancy to the subject matter, see, ag.,
Brunswick Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 29rF. Supp. 118, 120 (E.D. Wis. 1968) (stat-
ing that relevancy is very broad concept). Indeed, one of the purposes of dis-
covery is to identify and to narrow the issues. See infra note 90 and
accompanying text.
72. "Taking the depostion of opposing counsel... adds to the already bur-
densome time and costs of litigation." Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327.
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ever, of resolving disputes over whether the information sought
is indeed "crucial." This determination itself would increase
the time and cost of litigation. Additionally, courts will have
difficulty actually defining the term crucial, because the term
is inherently ambiguous and requires a subjective
determination.7"
A further drawback to requiring a party to show that the
information sought is crucial is that the requirement will take
control of the litigation planning and strategy process away
from the attorney and place it in the hands of the court. Be-
cause the Shelton test vests the power to determine which in-
formation is crucial, and therefore discoverable, in the court,
the court, rather than the attorneys, will determine which in-
formation the attorneys should pursue and which lines of inves-
tigation they should drop.74
The "crucial" requirement also may have a chilling effect
on the discovery process in situations where the attorney's cli-
ent has very limited funds. In such situations, the attorney
may decide to forgo seeking discovery of certain information
rather than performing the discovery and risking having to ex-
pend limited funds proving to a court that the information
sought is "crucial."
The Shelton court's goal of attempting to restrict the prac-
tice of deposing the opposing counsel may be appropriate to
prevent unwarranted intrusions into an attorney's preparation,
but because of the shortcomings noted above,75 courts should
abandon the third prong of the test. The remaining two re-
quirements of the test, if applied by courts with force and rigor,
are sufficient to protect an attorney from unwarranted intru-
sions and to avoid the "borrowing of wits." Thus, courts should
modify the Shelton attorney deposition test to retain the re-
quirements that the information sought be unobtainable from
73. Crucial is defined as something "important or essential as decisive or
as resolving a crisis." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW LNTERNATIONAL DICrIoNARY 545
(1986). The likelihood of two attorneys, or a court and an attorney, agreeing
on whether a certain piece of information is crucial is remote at best. More
importantly, attorneys would be required to prove that the information was
crucial at the time the deposition was sought-a very early stage in the
proceeding.
74. Taken to its extreme, the "crucial" requtirement also may lead to the
absurd result of forcing the attorney to reveal his legal impressions and theo-
ries. In attempting to prove that the information is "crucial," counsel may
have to show how the particular information fits into its overall scheme,
thereby revealing legal theories.
75. See supa notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
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other sources and that it be relevant and unprivileged, while
abandoning the requirement that the information sought be
"crucial."
B. THE UNNECESSARY EXPANSION OF THE OPINION
WORK-PRoDucT DoCTniNE
The Shelton decision expands the opinion work-product
doctrine to provide protection from inquiries into the mere
existence or nonexistence of documents.76 According to the
court, in cases where the attorney has sifted through "volumi-
nous files," merely acknowledging the existence or nonexis-
tence of a document will reveal the attorney's mental
impressions.7 7 Although the Federal Rules do protect an attor-
ney's mental impressions from discovery,78 the court unjustifi-
ably expanded this protection, ignoring settled case law and
other provisions of the Federal Rules.
1. Shelton Contradicts the Case Law and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure
The Shelton decision calls into question more than thirty
years of prior case law holding that the work-product doctrine
does not prevent inquiries into the mere existence or nonexis-
tence of documents.79 Prior court decisions unanimously held
that these were appropriate inquiries during depositions.8 0
These cases established the principle, reflective of the broad
disclosure philosophy of the Federal Rules, that discovery re-
quires access to this type of information. Courts therefore
rarely restricted these types of inquiries.8 '
The court's opinion also failed adequately to consider the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rules contain a provi-
sion explicitly stating that parties may obtain discovery regard-
ing any matter not privileged, including the existence of
documents.8 2 Not only does this language show that seeking to
76. See Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1329.
77. Id-
78. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(b)(3); supra note 36 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
'80. I.
81. Id; see infra notes 83, 90.-
82. Rule 26(b)(1) provides:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action
.. including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and
location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the
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ascertain whether a document exists is permissible, it also indi-
cates that the rulemakers, by including the words not privi-
leged and existence in the same sentence, did not consider
inquiries as to the existence of a document a privileged matter.
Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the fed-
eral courts, the Shelton court's mistaken interpretation of this
provision expressly violates them. Moreover, by ignoring the
Federal Rules, the court effectively imposed a judicial decision
in place of a legislative decision 8 3
2. Shelton's Policy Arguments Are Unfounded
In addition to ignoring the relevant case law and the Fed-
eral Rules, the Shelton court based its decision on unfounded
policy considerations. The court appeared to premise its deci-
sion in part on the same policy concerns it noted when attempt-
ing to limit the general practice of deposing the opposing
counsel. The court's policy concerns do not arise in the context
of deposing an opposing attorney merely to discover whether a
document exists.
The Shelton court's primary concern was to prevent an at-
torney, through deposition, from misappropriating the work of
another attorney,8 4 thereby rewarding laziness and penalizing
diligence. Even assuming, as the court does, that merely ac-
identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable
matter.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
83. One also can draw an analogy to the discovery of witness information
under Rule 26(b)(1). This Rule states: "parties may obtain discovery regarding
... the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable
matter." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Although a party cannot, through discovery,
compel attorneys to disclose the information witnesses gave to them, see Hick-
man v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512-13 (1947), a party is free to learn the names
and addresses of the witnesses. As the rule relates to the issue at hand then, a
party cannot compel the opposing counsel to reveal the content of its discus-
sions with witnesses. Parties may, however, learn of the existence or nonexis-
tence of witnesses from their adversaries. As a commentator has stated,
"[plaintiff's attorney cannot utilize discovery or make his own investigation
unless he knows the names of the witnesses. To hold that his opponent can
keep this information from him is contrary to the purposes that underlie the
discovery rules." 8 C. WRIGiiT & A. MILLER, supra note 12, § 2013, at 105. The
same logic seems to apply to discovering the mere existence or nonexistence of
documents within the knowledge of the opposing counsel.
84. The court cited a passage from Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in
Hickman: 'Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to
perform its functions ... on wits borrowed from the adversary." Shelton v.
American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1327 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
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knowledging the existence of a document does reveal an attor-
ney's legal impressions, the opposing attorney could not afford
to follow through with discovery only on those items that the
attorney acknowledged in a deposition did exist. No attorney
could be confident that an opponent would acknowledge all the
items important to the deposing attorney's position. Thus, at-
torneys cannot afford to forgo diligent discovery by relying on
the opposing attorney's acknowledgments. Not only could such
reliance be a strategic error, but an attorney could risk incur-
ring substantial malpractice liability. Thus, the overall benefits
to the discovery system of the current practice8 5 greatly out-
weigh any abuse that may result from it. Courts therefore
should not prohibit the practice.
The Shelton court also expressed concern that allowing a
party to depose an attorney and forcing the deponent to reveal
the existence of certain documents could jeopardize the com-
munication between attorney and client, thereby reducing the
quality of client representation 86 It seems highly unlikely,
however, that attorneys who are potential deponents would
forgo a thorough investigation of the client's records simply be-
cause they subsequently may have to acknowledge in a deposi-
tion the existence of a document which may aid the adversary.
Thus, such a co'ncern does not seem to constitute a compelling
policy basis for the court's decision.
Another of the court's policy concerns was the notion that
allowing a party to depose an attorney and then forcing the de-
ponent to acknowledge the existence or nonexistence of certain
documents would provoke work-product objections and add to
the time and cost of litigation.8 7 If courts reinstate the pre-
Shelton rule whereby the work-product doctrine does not pre-
vent existence questions, however, no issue remains and fur-
ther litigation is unnecessary. Despite its stated desire to
reduce litigation, the Shelton court's decision can work only to
increase lifigation. By calling into question settled case law, the
court injects a degree of uncertainty into the area, which will
85. The "benefits" referred to are those benefits previously discussed asso-
ciated with a.liberal system of discovery. See supra notes 29, 83, infra note 90
and accompanying text.
86. See Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327 (discussing "chilling effect" that such
practice will have on truthful communications from client to attorney).
87. See id. (suggesting that it is "not hard to imagine additional pretrial
delays to res6lve work-product and attorney-client objections, as well as delays
to resolve collateral issues raised by the attorney's testimony").
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only invite further challenges and foster further litigation. 8
3. Shelton Overlooked Benefits of Having Attorneys
Acknowledge Document Existence
In focusing on the possible negative ramifications of requir-
ing an attorney to acknowledge the existence or nonexistence
of a document,89 the Shelton court overlooked entirely the ben-
efits of allowing such a practice. The Supreme Court high-
lighted these benefits when it stated that courts are broadly to
construe the deposition-discovery rules and that courts should
permit liberal discovery, allowing parties to obtain the fullest
possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.90 Attor-
neys will be unable to focus on the relevant facts and issues un-
til they know if or where these facts exist. Because courts
generally have allowed broad discovery, courts should be slow
to restrict discovery and should do so only when reasonable and
necessary.91 The Shelton court did not base its limitation on
88. Indeed, prior to Shelton, the issue of whether existence-type discovery
inquiries were appropriate rarely surfaced, and the case law clearly validated
such inquiries. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. The Shelton de-
cision indicates that this area is no longer "settled," thus inviting more
litigation.
89. Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1328 (emphasizing policy reasons for not interfer-
ing with attorney's preparations).
90. See Hickcman, 329 U.S. at 507-08 (stating that deposition-discovery
rules are to be broadly and liberally interpreted, within limitations of specific
privileges); see also supra note 29 (noting benefits of a broad scope of discov-
ery). The Hickman Court stated further that "[m]utual knowledge of all the
relevant facts gathered -by both parties is essential to proper litigation." Hick-
man, 329 U.S. at 507.
In discussing the existence of documents, a leading treatise on federal pro-
cedure says:
Discovery has three distinct purposes and uses ....
(3) To secure information about the existence of evidence that
may be used at the trial and to ascertain how and from whom it may
be procured, as for instance, the existence, custody, and location of
pertinent documents or the names and addresses of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts ....
The discovery procedure adopted by Rules 26 to 37 enables a
party not only to narrow the issues and obtain evidence for use at the
trial, but also to discover information about where and how such evi-
dence can be obtained. The scope of discovery has been made very
broad and the restrictions imposed upon it are directed chiefly at the
use of, rather than the acquisition of, the information discovered.
8 C. WRIGHT & A. MIntER, supra note 12, § 2001, at 15 (footnotes omitted).
91. It is important to remember that much of what is discoverable is not
admissible into evidence at trial. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (stating that it is
"not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at
trial"). In many instances the jury therefore will not have any knowledge
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either of these exceptions to the policy considerations behind
the broad discovery rules.
4. Attorneys Remember More than Just Important
Documents
At the core of the Shelton court's decision is its finding that
mere acknowledgment by an attorney of the existence or non-
existence of a document, in situations where the attorney has
sifted through voluminous files, necessarily will reveal the at-
torney's mental impressions, which the work-product doctrine
protects.92 The court's premise for this finding is that after
searching through numerous documents, attorneys will remem-
ber only those that they believe are significant and important.93
The Shelton court seemed to base this conclusion on broad,
unsubstantiated assumptions about human behavior and mem-
ory capabilities. The court postulated that after searching volu-
minous files, attorneys would remember only what is important
and would forget everything that is unimportant. Nowhere in
its decision did the court attempt to substantiate its claim by
reference to any psychological or other social science authori-
ties. Certainly the same professionals that courts expect to re-
member voluminous rules and legal principles94 are capable of
remembering more than merely the important and significant
documents. Acknowledging the mere existence of a document
therefore will not necessarily reveal opinion work-product, be-
cause attorneys will remember many documents. Documents
recalled may or may not relate to the attorney's legal theories.
Even if such disclosure occasionally does reveal legal theory in
practice, attorneys' opponents never can be certain that their
opponents have done so in a given case, because attorneys may
remember many documents.
about the existence of such information and will not consider it in arriving at
the verdict.
92. See Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1329. Specifically, the mental impressions that
the court attempted to protect are opinion work-product. See supra note 34
and accompanying text.
93. It therefore follows that by answering "yes" to an inquiry of this type,
the attorney tells the other party that "this document is important; I looked at
it and remembered it." The converse also would be true; if an attorney an-
swers "no," it would signal the other party that the document was
unimportant.
94. Attorneys frequently are held to have immediate knowledge of things




5. The Shelton Court Failed to Define Voluminous
The Shelton court, in reaching its decision to expand the
opinion work-product doctrine, used such ambiguous terms that
it is difficult to determine the exact circumstances under which
the court's holding will apply.95 The court, by its own language,
intended its ruling to apply only where the attorney has
searched through "voluminous files."96 The term voluminous
is inherently ambiguous.9 7 Thus, because the Shelton court
used such an ambiguous term without clarifying its meaning,
confusion as to when the holding will apply is inevitable, and
may lead to increased litigation. This ambiguous term leaves
open a critical issue that a court must resolve through 'subse-
quent litigation, necessarily adding more cases to the docket,
contrary to the court's stated desire.98
6. Prior Opinion-Work Product Protection is Sufficient
The Shelton court unnecessarily expanded the opinion
work-product doctrine, because acknowledging the mere exist-
ence of a document does not necessarily reveal an attorney's
mental impressions.9 9 Moreover, the work-product doctrine
protections existing before the Shelton decision suffice to en-
sure the protection of an attorney's mental impressions. In
cases of this type prior to Shelton, courts limited the scope of
protection that the opinion work-product doctrine offered to
95. Additionally, the court appeared to adopt its holding as a univeral
rule, applicable in all situations in which the attorney has searched through
voluminous files. The court should have made an allowance, however, for the
memory capacity of the particular attorney involved. For example, the
Shelton holding should not apply to an attorney with a "photographic mem-
ory." Such an attorney possibly could remember every document, and mem-
ory of a document's existence would not reveal the degree of importance the
attorney attached to any document. Ascertaining memory capacity, however,
would require a case-by-case analysis, and thus would increase litigation time
and cost.
96. Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1326. The court also refers to "cases that involve
reams of documents." I&c at 1329.
97. Voluminous is defined as "numerous" and "capable of filling a large
volume." WEBSTER'S THIRD Naw INTERNATIONAL DiCTIoNARY 2563-64 (1986).
98. In addition to necessitating the difficulty of defining voluminous, the
court inevitably created a certain degree of arbitrariness. If a court must de-
cide each dispute on a case-by-case basis, the court certainly has not attained
its goal of reducing litigation. Conversely, if a court attempts to establish a
"rule" that whenever attorneys search through a certain number of files, they
will not have to answer "existence questions," this "magic number" is bound
to have little correlation to whether the specific attorney's actual mental im-
pressions are revealed, and the rule will be inherently arbitrary.
99. See supra Part III(B)(4).
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work involving something the attorney had done, prepared,
written, or in some way caused to be made, which embodied the
mental impressions and conclusions of the attorney.100 Thus, if
AMC's attorney in Shelton had compiled an actual list of the
specific documents she deemed important and significant, the
opinion work-product doctrine would have protected that list
and opposing counsel therefore could not have discovered the
list. This rationale treats the list as embodying the attorney's
mental impressions. By protecting the list rather than the ac-
knowledgment, courts administer the concept with much more
clarity and certainty. Such a rule, together with the practice of
allowing parties to inquire into the mere existence or nonexis-
tence of a document, adequately would protect an attorney's
mental impressions and also would facilitate the discovery of
information needed to provide each party with the fullest possi-
ble knowledge of all the facts relevant to the pending action.
In addition to sufficiently protecting opinion work product, this
standard offers the important benefit of being workable and
precise.
A court desiring something-beyond the protections that the
opinion work-product doctrine existing prior to Shelton offered
might permit an attorney to discover from the opposing counsel
whether certain documents exist, but might also require that
the attorney make such inquiries through interrogatories under
Rule 26(c). 03. As noted earlier, some courts have used this
method to avoid all depositions of attorneys.102 Although
courts have the discretion to invoke the requirements of Rule
26(c), they may require the mandatory use of interrogatories
rather than depositions when attorneys request existence or
nonexistence information from opposing counsel. Mandatory
use of interrogatories would permit a liberal system of discov-
ery and ensure that both parties have access to all relevant in-
formation, while protecting an attorney's mental impressions
by avoiding the spontaneous'responses that depositions may re-
quire. Acknowledging the existence of a document by means of
a response to a written interrogatory does not reveal an attor-
ney's mental impression about the importance of that docu-
100. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
101. Courts, pursuant to Rule 26(c), have the authority to order that dis-
covery occur only through the methods they designate. See supra note 27 and
accompanying text. This prop~osal therefore would not conflict with present
discovery rules.
102. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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ment, because the attorney so responding presumably has had
time to review all relevant documents in the party's possession.
CONCLUSION
Courts traditionally have restricted the practice of taking
the deposition of the opposing counsel to assure that attorneys
have a degree of privacy in peiforming their tasks. The Shelton
court's new attorney deposition test imposes limitations that go
beyond what is necessary to prevent unwarranted intrusions
into an attorney's preparation for trial. A better solution is to
require that parties desiring to depose opposing counsel seek
relevant, nonprivileged information that is unavailable from
other discoverable sources. Courts thus should eliminate the
Shelton court's requirement that the information be "crucial"
to the case, because the term is ambiguous and will not pro-
mote important policy considerations.
The Shelton court further restricted discoverable informa-
tion by expanding the coverage of the opinion work-product
doctrine. In attempting to afford greater protection to an attor-
ney's mental impressions, the Eighth Circuit made unwar-
ranted assumptions and failed to clarify fully the applicability
of its holding. In doing so, the court overlooked the wisdom of
both case precedent and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Moreover, the court misconstrued the policy considerations un-
derlying the discovery process. The court also failed to strike a
compromise between the two positions when an apparerit solu-
tion was readily available. Courts therefore either should re-
turn to the prior, settled practice of allowing inquiries during
depositions into the mere existence of documents or should al-
low these inquiries to occur through interrogatories.
Brian R. Piose
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